Virginia: Virginia State Crime Commission

Kristen Howard (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Yes. Delegate Delaney. There she is. Delegate Hope. Delegate Kilgore. Here. Mr. Speaker. Delegate Williams. Senator Lucas. Here. Senator Peake. I believe he was going to try and join us virtually, so we'll just need to keep an eye on that. Senator Surovell. Mr. Bell.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Here.

Kristen Howard (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Mr. Cruiser. Here. Ms. Davenport. Here. Ms. Evans. Here. Madam Chair.

Charniele Herring

I'm here. Thank you so much. And we have a quorum. Thank you. Do I have a motion for approval of the October 22nd meeting minutes?

Committee member (Virginia State Crime Commission)

So moved.

Charniele Herring

All right, it's been moved and properly seconded that the meeting minutes be approved. All in favor say aye. Aye. Those opposed, no. All right, the minutes are approved. And I believe we have some introductions. Kristen Howard.

Kristen Howard (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Yes, thank you, Madam Chair. I'm pleased to announce we are at full staff and we have 2 new attorneys who have joined us. And I'd like to quickly introduce them. If you could just raise your hand. Justin Brewster. previously was at the Virginia Beach Commonwealth Attorney's Office and then moved to Chesterfield and spent some time at the Attorney General's Office, and we were lucky enough to have him apply for the Crime Commission. So new attorney, Justin Brewster, sitting up front to the far right, almost at the end. And then we also were lucky enough to have 2 attorneys apply in our hiring round and were able to select Po Chow as well. She has extensive experience practicing and began her career in civil practice and then was at the Richmond in Public Defender's Office for over 10 years and then at the Henrico County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office for 12 years. So welcome to Po Chow as well, and we're really excited to have them join our team with their extensive knowledge practicing in the criminal justice system.

Charniele Herring

Thank you so much, and on behalf of the Crime Commission, Justin and Po, thank you for, for agreeing to serve and taking on the tasks that we have ahead, and it's a pleasure to have you. With the team. Thank you. All right. First on the agenda is our study on the law enforcement use of automatic license plate recognition. And before we have staff jump into their presentation, I just want to take a moment and remind everyone where we started with this issue. Virginia, before passing the legislation recommended by this Crime Commission, Virginia was in the wild, wild west as far as the technology was concerned. It was already being used by law enforcement agencies, and neither localities nor the Commonwealth had guardrails as far as how it could be used, accessed, or regulated. My primary concern when I brought this to the Commission was to ensure that we were using technology in a responsible manner that balances people's right to privacy and their safety. While I'm glad to see that by and large law enforcement is complying with the laws we have put in place, and that we have received recognition by academic review for the strength of our law. One of the main reasons we've asked that the Crime Commission staff with researching and monitoring this issue is to ensure that we can make sure that technology is being used at the net benefit for the safety of the Commonwealth while ensuring people's privacy remains protected. I look forward to hearing an update on the current report and where we stand today. And so with that, we will go ahead and turn it over for the report. And just for everyone to know that the, the study has been posted on the Crime Commission website. It's a, it's a very well done study and report, and I commend the staff for all of the work that you have done. And so let's— Need my napkin? Here we go.

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the Commission. Today's presentation provides an update on law enforcement use of automatic license plate recognition. Virginia's ALPR statute went into effect July of last year. Prior— I apologize. Is that better? Okay. There we go.

Charniele Herring

Unfortunately, you may need to lean into it so that everyone can hear.

Charniele Herring

All right. Thank you. Are there any questions? Yes, please. Please, Senator Surovell, and then—

Scott Surovell

Thanks for the presentation. I had a couple questions. Going backwards, on the disparate impact piece, how does the stop data for LPRs compare with stop data generally? I mean, I know there's generally disparate impacts on stop data. Is the LPR, ALPR stops, are they more disparate or the same or?

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Well, Madam Chair, Senator Surovell, when looking at the non-ALPR-related stops, we do see disparate impacts for Black males. They comprise 30% of the non-ALPR stops, which is roughly 12% less than the LP— the all of the ALPR-related stops. And for Black males, they comprise 19% of all non-ALPR Non— yes, non-ALPR stops compared to 32% of the ALPR-related stops. So a difference of about 12% when you look at the comparison between the non-ALPR-related stops and the ALPR-related stops. There's still a disparate impact for Black males. They comprise only 9% of Virginia's population, and if you look at the non-ALPR-related stops, they comprise 19% of those.

Scott Surovell

Okay, Madam Chair.

Charniele Herring

Yes, go ahead.

Scott Surovell

I'm trying to follow you here. So I understand that traffic stops in general, there are disparate impacts. There have been for decades, and we tried to fix that with Senator Lucas's bill a couple years ago in part. But how much difference is there in the disparate impact between traffic stops generally and That would be the 12% for Black males.

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

There's a 12% difference. And for Black individuals altogether, also 12% between non-ALPR-related stops and ALPR-related stops for both categories.

Scott Surovell

Okay. I have another question, Manager.

Charniele Herring

Yes, go ahead, Senator.

Scott Surovell

Okay. I'd just be curious as to What explains that? I don't know whether— there's probably some way to analyze the data to come up with further light on that, but I'm just curious about that, number one. Number two, my recollection is that in Delegate Herring's bill, Chair Herring's bill that we passed a couple years ago, systems were not allowed to be certified for use If they didn't meet certain minimum standards like the auditing requirements, the data retention, all that kind of stuff. I'm not understanding why localities are able to retain data longer than the certified systems are supposed to be allowed to do that. I mean, is there— are they somehow able to override the settings on these systems or what?

Kristen Howard (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Do we know? Yes. The vendor certification process really was a partnership between DPS and VITA in looking at the security standards. And whether the vendor could be in compliance with the statute. So because the vendor is in compliance with the statute, it does not mean that an agency could make other decisions or policy changes that exceed perhaps those days.

Scott Surovell

Thank you. All right. Madam Chair.

Charniele Herring

Yes, Timmy.

Timmy French

Thanks. So, I'm trying to pull up my agenda here. What's clear to me is I know we've had 2 prosecutions, even though there's been apparently 20 instances of unauthorized access of LPR data. For some reason, law enforcement agencies aren't choosing to charge the other 18 people who've broken the law that we passed. Just one question there, which is interesting. I know Senator Jones, I believe, has already said he's going to put in a bill to allow for decertification of police officers that violate LPR policy. It seems to me that we need probably stronger consequences for law enforcement agencies that are not following the laws that we pass.

Charniele Herring

Yeah.

Glen Sturtevant

I'm curious whether we're going to have any conversation about that. I know some people want to get rid of these things just in general, but— It strikes me that the consequences that we have are not really adequate to deter agencies from not following our statute. I'm just curious if we're going to talk about that.

Glen Sturtevant

Madam Chair?

Charniele Herring

Yes, Senator.

Glen Sturtevant

Good. Well, I'm glad we're going to talk about that because, I mean, I understand there's been problems with these systems being used primarily in other states. I want to note I don't think there have been as— the examples that we hear about in the media are mostly not Virginia examples, but in terms of the problems that we've seen with these things. But, um, I, I would hope that we could reach a consensus about some, some stronger consequences to If localities want to choose to continue to use them, they follow the rules that we set.

Charniele Herring

Agreed, and we will definitely. Thank you. Commonwealth Attorney Bell.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Thank you, Madam Chair. So I want to piggyback on Senator Surovell. The first part was you mentioned the non-ALR rate versus those who are within the ALR rate? Are you saying the non is higher than the ones that are within the ALR rate?

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

That it's actually opposite. So for example, Black males— excuse me, Black individuals comprise 20% of Virginia's population. For the non-ALPR stops, They account for 30% of the non-ALPR-related stops, but 42% of the ALPR-related stops. And then if we consider Black males, they comprise 9% of Virginia's population. For the non-ALPR-related stops, they comprise 19% of those, but for the ALPR-related stops, they comprise 32% of those.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Okay, Madam Chair. Also, you mentioned about the noncompliance by law enforcement agencies. Were you able to identify who those law enforcement agencies were?

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Yes.

Charniele Herring

Yes.

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

I apologize. No, no, no, you can go ahead. Madam Chair, Mr. Bell, yes, there were agencies that were identified for certain categories of noncompliance, and they would be in Appendix D of the report on page 68.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Madam Chair?

Charniele Herring

Yes.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

And were you able to identify how they were able to be non-compliant and not fall within some type of violation of the statute that was previously passed by the General Assembly?

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Madam Chair?

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Maybe let me be a little clearer. A criminal violation. Why they would not be in criminal violation of the statute that was previously passed.

Charniele Herring

Madam Chair, Mr. Bell. Right. And it's not—

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Madam Chair, Mr. Bell, are you referring to the criminal penalty in the statute? Yes. Okay. And in looking at some of those instances, I believe that the charges filed related to I guess the incidents where charges were not filed seemed to relate to incidents where the information was provided to maybe a federal law enforcement agency or some other investigating agency. So there was a violation. However, the Commonwealth Attorney in that jurisdiction chose not to proceed with criminal charges in those instances. So it was a discretionary matter on the part of the Commonwealth Attorney. Okay. In several of the instances that were identified.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Okay. And Madam Chair?

Charniele Herring

Yes.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

Uh, would you find it beneficial if there were, there were some type of legislation that would make enforcement non-discretionary by Commonwealth attorneys or by the law enforcement locality So we can—

Charniele Herring

yeah, I think that's a policy decision for us. Okay. And I think we can certainly pull that into the mix of what we can consider next, next meeting.

Bell (Commonwealth's Attorney's Office)

And then one comment, Madam Chair. Yes. So, uh, in speaking with quite a number of the Commonwealth attorneys, uh, we have seen great benefits to the license plate readers. However, with any law enforcement tool, We recognize there has to always be checks and balances on anything where there's the availability or opportunity for abuse.

Charniele Herring

Agreed. Thank you so much. Thank you. Oh yes, we've got Delegate Kilgore.

Terry Kilgore

I was just trying to find the list of the noncom— you said there was a list here of the noncom— 69 through 75.

Charniele Herring

Okay, thank you. Thank you. Oh, okay, sorry. And then if you want to ask anything next, Kilgore, just let me know. Oh, Delegate Williams.

Wren Williams

Thank you, Madam Chair. A question for the patron.

Charniele Herring

Yes, please go ahead.

Wren Williams

I was curious if you could— if there was— if people— if you were able to drill down to Who is abusing it? As in, like, are they deputies or is it staff or like 911 dispatchers?

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Yeah, Madam Chair, Delegate Williams, in most instances we were not able to. They were asked to provide the nature and the circumstances of any areas they were non-compliant in, and in many instances they did not provide that level of detail.

Charniele Herring

And follow-up, Madam Chair? Yes, Delegate.

Wren Williams

So inside of a department, does practically everybody have access to the information?

Committee staff (Virginia State Crime Commission)

Or have you figured that out? Madam Chair, Delegate Williams, it depends on the agency. We had variation across agencies in terms of whether it was officers, dispatchers, crime analysts, and the activity that they could provide in terms of searching or audits.

Charniele Herring

One more. Yes, go ahead, Delegate Williams.

Wren Williams

I know that sometimes we do— there are particular people who are certified to do like child sex abuse type of material, you know, CCM material. And like maybe that's a thought. Those are the only ones certified to handle that.

Charniele Herring

That's it. That's a good point. And we can add that as well. And if I'm not mistaken, I think the State Police have only designated individuals who are able to access, from what I recall. And just for people's— the survey, so you can see what was asked, so it starts on page 50 in the appendix, Appendix C. Any other questions? All right, thank you. Thank you. And now, yes, and then we do have People signed up for comment. Just one second. First, I have Rob Pogonclas. I apologize if I mispronounced that. Just call him Rob. Just call him Rob. Welcome, Rob.

Rob Pogonclas (ACLU of Virginia)

Thank you, Madam Chair. Rob Pogonclas from the ACLU of Virginia. The ACLU of Virginia opposes mass surveillance because it violates our constitutional rights to privacy, free speech, and assembly. We oppose the use of ALPRs by law enforcement for 3 main reasons. Virginians deserve the freedom to live their lives without having their everyday movements tracked and cataloged. ALPR technology gives billion-dollar corporations growing power over our lives and puts already marginalized communities at greater risk. And the regulations will still leave surveillance intact as its reach and power grow. I had planned to expound on these ideas, but yesterday's report cataloged some serious violations that deserve public scrutiny. During the 2025 session, the General Assembly enacted guardrails on ALPR use by law enforcement. And when the General Assembly enacts criminal laws, the expectation is that people will heed those laws. Unfortunately, we have seen here in Virginia that the guardrails on ALPRs do not work. Yesterday's report documents self-reported lawbreaking and noncompliance by Virginia law enforcement agencies that include keeping ALPR system and audit trail data past the retention period, failing to perform required audits as required, failing to inform communities that they are being surveilled, and sharing system data with the federal government and law enforcement in other states. Despite this lawlessness, only 2 people have been charged with violations of the ALPR law. And you can increase the penalties for these violations if you like, but there will be no one to enforce them because there is no policing the police. Even if we somehow figured out a way to hold law enforcement accountable for busting through the guardrails, we're still left with the tech companies that will always prioritize their bottom line. The goal of these companies— Flock, Axon, Motorola, etc.— is not public safety. It is to make as much money as possible. While technology can be helpful to law enforcement, we cannot continue to hand over sensitive personal information such as location data to the highest bidder. And that's what exactly what's happening with these surveillance technologies. Today we're talking about ALPRs, but the same logic applies drones as first responders, real-time crime centers, and all the various platforms that make it easier for law enforcement to track people's movements regardless of whether they've done anything wrong. And these companies will keep peddling their technology so long as it's profitable, regardless of whether it makes anyone safer. The best way to keep our communities safe is to end mass surveillance. We should start by banning ALPRs in Virginia. Thank you.

Charniele Herring

Thank you so much. Next, we have Mitchell Smith. For the Institute for Justice. Welcome. You have 2 minutes.

Charlie Schmidt

Thank you, Madam Chair, members of the Commission. My name is Mitchell Schmidt. I'm a legislative counsel at the Institute for Justice. IJ is a nonprofit public interest law firm based in Arlington, Virginia, that works through litigation and legislation to protect our constitutional rights. Modern AI-driven automatic license plate reader technology lets the government travel back in time and reconstruct where people went, whom they saw, and what they did, all at the click of a button and without a warrant. Those were the concerns the General Assembly tried to address in 2025 by enacting legislation that purported to limit widespread mass surveillance. Unfortunately, the commission's 2 reports have demonstrated significant and ongoing non-compliance with that law. So as you consider further reforms to prevent abuse before it happens, I encourage you to consider 2 very brief points. The first is that we do not surrender our constitutional rights when we leave our houses and go out in public. The Supreme Court has already ruled the government needs a warrant before they attach a GPS tracker to your car, pull your cell site location information, or obtain even a brief window of a person's location data from a private company. IJ's federal challenges, including a case challenging Norfolk, Virginia's warrantless mass surveillance that is currently pending before the Fourth Circuit have exposed these dangers. In Norfolk alone, ALPRs recorded our clients' locations hundreds of times over a 4-month period. That is mass surveillance. My second point is that the Commission's reports show that self-policing is just simply not enough. The best way to stop abuse is to prevent it from happening in the first place. Because ALPRs do not just show a day in the life, they show a way of life, The position that we've taken in our litigation is clear. Before you can conduct mass surveillance at the scale we've seen in the Commonwealth, you must first get a warrant. Thank you so much.

Charniele Herring

Appreciate your time. Thank you for coming. Chelsea Higgs-Weiss. Chelsea? Yes, you're up. It's a different room. Oh, that's all right. Welcome. You have 2 minutes.

Chelsea Higgs-Weiss

All right, come on up. Good afternoon. My name is Chelsea Higgs Wise, and this is Rosalynn Crump, whose life was upended Because of an automatic surveillance failure.

Chelsea Higgs-Weiss

At 2 AM on July 29th in Richmond, Roslyn was woken up by police officers demanding to tow her car because an automatic surveillance incorrectly flagged her 2012 Hyundai Elantra following a nearby drive-by shooting. Police had no suspect license plate, only a vague search by color, make, and year. Roslyn pleaded with officers saying they had the wrong car, pointing to the child seats, and despite this, police dismissed her explanations, calling her a liar, and towed away her vehicle. Hours later, the actual suspect was identified, clearing Roslyn completely. Yet no one identified the car, let her know that the car was released, and by the time it was recovered days later, it had suffered catastrophic towing damage that was declared a total loss. Without transportation, she suffered severe financial hardships, missed shifts, and ultimately lost her job. This technology imposes an unacceptable burden. Right now, there's no Current legal protections to shield law enforcement. There are too many legal protections to shield law enforcement from financial liability while investigations rely on faulty AI algorithms, leaving Virginians with no easy access to compensation. Tech vendors evade responsibility by claiming they only provide data, creating an accountability vacuum between private companies, municipalities, and towing contractors. And the data retention limits offer no protection, as Roslyn's car was wrongly flagged, towed, and destroyed within days. Restricting the data retention does not help. And unfortunately, the Richmond Police Department offered a public apology and donated to her GoFundMe. On behalf of Rosalynn and working families, we're asking you across the community to recommend banning these systems because right now we just don't have enough to protect Virginians that are being harmed. Thank you.

Charniele Herring

Ms. Crump, welcome.

Rosalynn Crump

Hi. Hi. New for me.

Charniele Herring

That's all right.

Rosalynn Crump

Yeah, I just feel like, um, a public apology. I didn't even know anything about it. So I just kind of feel dismissed and just— I don't even know if I say taken advantage of or just dismissed.

Rosalynn Crump

They didn't care about how I felt, how I left my family. I've been struggling since then. I'm a single mom of 3 boys and in a high crime rate environment, and I'm trying to remove me and my children from there, and they put me in a really tough situation. And I just need somebody to either fix what they put me in, I mean, because this has been really tough for me.

Charniele Herring

That's it. Happened. And thank you for—

Rosalynn Crump

and yeah, I'm looking for a public representation, so I don't have anybody to represent me at the moment.

Charniele Herring

Okay. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate it. I appreciate it. Dwayne Barron from Justice Forward. Welcome. Welcome.

Dwayne Barron (Justice Forward)

Good afternoon, Chair Herring and committee. My name is Dwayne Barron. I'm the Chief Public Defender in Staunton, Lexington. I'm also a board member of Justice Forward. And this, you know, this commission, as you know, is charged with studying public safety. And as Delegate Herren mentioned at the beginning, it always means balancing safety against rights. This report is impressive, carefully footnoted, and deeply troubling. However, despite all of the bad things it reports, it actually never asks the question, do these cameras make Virginia safer? It surveyed the police twice, but never the people. And rights don't belong to the police, to this commission, or to the legislature. Rights belong to the people. Can a license plate reader help me find a stolen— help the police find a stolen car, or maybe my Lost scooter? Probably, but that's not the question. The question is, are we safer when a private company working for the government records everywhere we go? Flock alone says it makes more than 20 billion scans a month. And nearly all of these people are people going to work, they're going to school, they're going to the grocery store, maybe they're taking a drive to look at the beautiful leaves that I saw as I drove here from Stanton today. But they're just everyday people going about their lives. Every camera is a node in a vast AI-connected database that can build a dossier of anyone's life on request. That makes me sound like a conspiracy theorist, but that's actually what it is. These harms aren't hypothetical. We just saw the harms. A Virginia officer snooped on his ex-girlfriend's— on his ex's new boyfriend. The Texas story about searching 83,000 cameras to find where the woman went. to get an abortion. Black Virginians that are over-policed already, even greater disparity because of APL strips. And the data can't be kept local. 80% of the agencies share it continuously. 5 admit giving it to federal agents with no warrant, no court order, nothing. Your sheriff, my sheriff could follow every rule, but yet— oh man, I'm not used to this. But all of that—

Charniele Herring

Time, wrap up.

Charniele Herring

Thank you. Thank you so much. Next, Eric Vento.

Eric Vento

Hello, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Eric Vento. I live in the 4th District. Of Virginia. I'm here to ask for a wholesale ban of this technology. I would like you to reframe your perspective on this matter away from the guardrails, um, and how to prevent abuse, because the technology itself is primed for abuse by its very nature. It collects data on millions of people in the Commonwealth who have done no crime, who have committed no crime. They are not part of an active police investigation. Excuse me, sorry, I left my glasses in the car. So, this technology is collecting data on the whereabouts, the comings and goings of millions of law-abiding citizens within our Commonwealth. So, please, for a moment, consider what someone could do if they knew that when you left your house, you will be gone for approximately 6.5 hours, and when your wife left your house. She was gone for 8.5 hours. I mean, think about over time what someone could do with this data. And when we go to these conversations about cybersecurity and that you own your data, I would just like to remind you that the federal government lost or had my own information exfiltrated in 2015. My employer had my information exfiltrated this or last year. Yeah. Stores I've shopped at, including Target, have had my information exfiltrated. So when you say the data is secure, that you can secure it, you are making a promise that you and these law enforcement agents cannot keep. So, may it help solve some crimes? Sure, it would be foolish to deny that. But will it keep Virginians safer or freer? No. For me, the answer is absolutely no. This is mass surveillance, and it is anathema to living in a free society. The government has no business keeping track of the whereabouts of me, my wife, my neighbors, and my friends. So I would ask you to please embrace, embrace your role as the guardrails and ban the technology outright. Thank you so much for your time.

Charniele Herring

Next is Aurora Britt.

Aurora Britt

All right. I'll keep this short. I'm not sure how many of you work in software and AI development, but I do. I'd just like to make it clear that anything connected to the internet will be hacked over the next few years. We've already seen it in Europe where automated fridge systems are being hacked by, like, non-state actors. If it's connected to the internet, it will be hacked over the next few years. Think about what this data could do for somebody who's trying to stalk their ex. You can know where they're going. You can know where they work. You can know their new house. Russian hackers have already sold— I don't know the number— multiple access keys for Flock networks. That problem will only continue.

Charniele Herring

Thank you. Scott Sliases, and I apologize, how do you pronounce your last name? It is like coleslaw with a Z. Okay. Well, now I will definitely remember that. Thank you.

Scott Sliases

Hello. Good afternoon. My name is just Scott. That will do. I am a nurse and I am a father living in Churchill neighborhood across the bridge there. I just want to give you a couple examples of, you know, well-meaning people using guardrails on technology that later ends up being Grossly misused. Domestic surveillance has good guardrails. '94, Janet Reno and Bill Clinton expanded the FISA, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, to wiretap suspected terrorists. This directly led to Bush W's ability to implement the Patriot Act and use it to spy on mosques wholesale with no reason. White phosphorus has guardrails. It's supposed to used for strictly smokescreen, illumination, and marking. But the US and its allies produces huge amounts, uses it basically as a chemical weapon in well-documented war crimes from Fallujah to Gaza. Flock cameras are becoming a pariah. The whole technology is becoming a pariah. The brand's universal community rejection is a rare glimpse of unity amongst an otherwise fractured political landscape. I really hope we can read the room here. Don't put up more guardrails and promise safe use when the guardrails that are already up are being driven straight through. ALPR vendors say they don't work with ICE, but people are being deported and families shattered because of their data. Wrongful arrests, guns drawn and pointed at the wrong traffic stop, illegal data sharing. erroneous property seizure and destruction, we can kind of get an idea where this is going. On the heels of the midterms, I really implore you to listen to the people and institute a statewide ban on all ALPR technology now. Thank you very much for your time.

Charniele Herring

Next is Zara Robinson. And after Zara will be Eric Bento.

Zaria Robinson

It's actually Zaria Robinson. Sorry, it's all good.

Charniele Herring

Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't see that. Thank you. No worries.

Zaria Robinson

I live here in Henrico where the Flock contract has already been banned, but I have to drive all around Virginia. So here I am to say that I strongly oppose the use of automatic license plate readers and mass vehicle surveillance systems mounted on our public infrastructure.

Zaria Robinson

I want to emphasize that this is not an argument against public safety or law enforcement, but an argument about what we're willing to sacrifice in the name of public safety and the ALRP's—

Zaria Robinson

ALPR's effectiveness.

Zaria Robinson

The cameras do not just identify vehicles associated with crimes. They collect information about everyone going about their daily lives while potentially allowing movements to be reconstructed. We cannot pretend that the guardrails in place eliminate these risks. Richmond has already experienced 2 incidents involving unauthorized access and improper sharing of this data. While disciplinary action was taken, the fact that these consequences were imposed after these incidents does not undo the breach of public trust Nor does it guarantee that it won't happen again. This leaves me with the question, what assurance can the public have that our movement data won't be accessed or used for purposes outside those originally promised? The Virginia State Crime Commission's own November 2026 report states that research evaluating the effectiveness of these systems remains limited. That same report found 759 ALPR-related investigatory stops where Black men were disproportionately represented. We have built a surveillance infrastructure without sufficient independent evidence that the safety benefits justify the privacy costs and potential harm. My concern is not just what these systems are being used for today, it's what they could be used for tomorrow and who could gain access to that information. The fact that this data is only retained for 21 days does not change the fact that our movements are being recorded and made searchable without individualized suspicion. I'm asking you to oppose the expansion of ALPR surveillance and support legislation Prohibiting its use in Virginia. I believe safety should not require surrendering the privacy and freedoms of an entire community. Thank you.

Charniele Herring

Thank you. Eric? Yeah, you're here twice. No worries. Almonte— I'm sorry, Cancelo? Okay, beautiful. Welcome. You have 2 minutes.

Alfonso Gonzalez

Good afternoon. I'm Alfonso Gonzalez, returned resident. So quite a lot has happened since the AOPI regulation was passed. Hundreds of reported abuses across the country, a bipartisan push across the country to get rid of them, hundreds of cities rejecting them, dozens of agencies across Virginia breaking the law with only 2 people being charged. Some people say a shift in public sentiment happened, but people were not in favor of this massive violence before. They just didn't know about this. This was all done in the COVID of night. Thank you. And when people were made aware, they've said near universally no to mass surveillance. In Richmond, where we have been trying to get the city to cancel the contract and not renew with another vendor, the city council, with the tagline the voice of the people, is going to come to the General Assembly and say we, who supposedly represent the people of Richmond, say they want more refined guardrails. But if you look to what the people have been saying, it's no to mass surveillance, and the diversity of reasons for why matches the diversity of Richmond. Reproductive choices, dating choices, immigration, being critical of police, religious freedoms, misreads. In the latest use report, it talks about how agencies have said that more are complying with the law and how unlawful data sharing is a rare occurrence. But it doesn't say anything about a surprising lack of charges for how many agencies have broken the law. What good is the ALPR regulation when we know dozens have broken the law, but only 2 people have been charged? I would also say that the AFPR regulations exempting data from FOIA has hurt us more than it could possibly help us. Mass surveillance doesn't need guardrails. It needs to be banned. Thank you.

Charniele Herring

Thank you so much. We have Victoria McCullough, and then our last will be Tamara Lewis, will be after Victoria.

Victoria McCullough

Good afternoon. My name is Victoria McCullough, and I'm also a resident of Richmond, Virginia, where we agreed as a city to get our Flock contract canceled next year. But I am one of many Virginians who also has to drive around the state daily. I'm here today with a number of others to call for an outright ban on automatic license plate readers in Virginia.

Victoria McCullough

People have been calling for this ban for the past 3 years, but in 2026, We saw, I think for the first time, growing resistance to mass surveillance around this entire country. Communities across the United States are increasingly challenging the assumption that surveillance equals safety and demanding that elected officials take seriously the civil liberties that these technologies imply.

Victoria McCullough

I specifically would like to flag 3 among many, but 3 big concerns that I would like this commission to consider. The private ownership of public surveillance infrastructure. Thank you. The lack of transparency and accountability surrounding these systems, and their growing role in facilitating abuse that includes immigration enforcement.

Victoria McCullough

Because firstly, why are we allowing private corporations to own and operate infrastructure that fundamentally affects the civil liberties of the public? These systems are purchased through taxpayer money and justified in the name of public safety, but the technology and the actual infrastructure are controlled by private companies like Flock Safety. Whose interests and accountability have no reason to be aligned with those in the communities they serve locally or regionally or as a state. Outsourcing public surveillance and account— and public accountability to private corporations is abuse. Virginians have no meaningful control over what information is being collected about us, who can access it, how it's shared, or what happens to it once it enters private networks where it inevitably at some point will be abused. Secondly, there's a profound lack of transparency. The public should not have to rely on public records requests or whistleblowers to find out how surveillance infrastructure might be being used or abused. And we should not have to wait for a scandal to learn that our local police departments may have been sharing information with outside agencies, or that data collected for one purpose is actually getting used for another, if that information ever does make it to the public. Do I continue?

Charniele Herring

I can wrap? Yes, yes, go ahead.

Victoria McCullough

Let me scroll all the way to the bottom. Virginians deserve better. We do deserve transparency, accountability, and the ability to move freely without our daily lives being documented on a searchable surveillance network controlled by private corporations. And so I really do urge that we get this technology banned as a state. Thank you.

Charniele Herring

Thank you. And Tamara Lewis, welcome. You have 2 minutes.

Tamara Lewis (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Tamara Lewis, and I'm with the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. There is a vast chasm between the people— what people think ALPRs are and how they are actually used. These are no longer tools that merely identify license plates. These are mass surveillance networks that record the travels of everyone with a vehicle, integrate them with other available data, and utilize artificial intelligence to identify who we associate with, what we do in our daily lives, and even predict what we will travel— where we will travel in the future.

Tamara Lewis (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

In addition to tracking a vehicle's movements over time and creating a comprehensive profile of a person's movement, ALPRs are now able to identify specific details of a car, so the color, the stickers, or other identifying features, and sometimes even identify who was in the car and traveling together.

Tamara Lewis (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

The danger in these tools lie beyond just the retrospective searches. The technology can be used to track people in real time. Oftentimes, the term hot list is employed, and people are left with the impression that there is real-time tracking to find a car that has been stolen or a child that has been kidnapped.

Tamara Lewis (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

And the experience of defense lawyers being on a hot list means that your client has had their movements tracked for months without probable cause. A warrant or judicial oversight.

Tamara Lewis (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

This is an extremely invasive form of surveillance that tracks everyone who moves on the roads without distinction. Because ALPRs have been used to target individuals engaged in protected First Amendment activity, as we've heard, stalk estranged lovers and locate political enemies.

Tamara Lewis (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

NACDL believes that ALPR databases should not be queried nor hotlists created without a warrant or than exigent circumstances. Any use of ALPR should be contained by limiting the length of time that the data is preserved to hours or minutes rather than days. This allows law enforcement to identify stolen vehicles and respond to Amber Alerts. And lastly, every city should evaluate whether the outlay of cash to purchase and maintain these systems matches the benefit they purportedly bring. Thank you.

Charniele Herring

Thank you so much. All right, um, does anybody, um, actually, is there anyone else? Okay, um, our next meeting, uh, is November 10th at 3:15, and we will consider all our policy decisions then, and, uh, and the Crime Commission will come back with some recommendations on language. All right. And with that, meeting's adjourned. Thank you. I'm sorry.